Who is patriotic

When these are exhibited in a reasonable degree and without ill thoughts about others and hostile actions towards them, that is patriotism; when they become unbridled and cause one to think ill of others and act badly towards them, that is nationalism.

Conveniently enough, it usually turns out that we are patriots, while they are nationalists see Billig , 55— There is yet another way of distinguishing patriotism and nationalism — one that is quite simple and begs no moral questions.

Both patriotism and nationalism involve love of, identification with, and special concern for a certain entity. Thus patriotism and nationalism are understood as the same type of set of beliefs and attitudes, and distinguished in terms of their objects, rather than the strength of those beliefs and attitudes, or as sentiment vs.

To be sure, there is much overlap between country and nation, and therefore between patriotism and nationalism; thus much that applies to one will also apply to the other.

But when a country is not ethnically homogeneous, or when a nation lacks a country of its own, the two may part ways. Patriotism has had a fair number of critics. The harshest among them have judged it deeply flawed in every important respect. In the 19 th century, Russian novelist and thinker Leo Tolstoy found patriotism both stupid and immoral. It is stupid because every patriot holds his own country to be the best of all whereas, obviously, only one country can qualify. Some of these objections can easily be countered.

However, there is another, more plausible line of criticism of patriotism focusing on its intellectual, rather than moral credentials. This suggests that patriotism can be judged from the standpoint of ethics of belief — a set of norms for evaluating our beliefs and other doxastic states.

Simon Keller has examined patriotism from this point of view, and found it wanting. Accordingly, she forms beliefs about her country in ways different from the ways in which she forms beliefs about other countries.

Moreover, she cannot admit this motivation while at the same time remaining a patriot. This leads her to hide from herself the true source of some of the beliefs involved. This is bad faith. Bad faith is bad; so is patriotism, as well as every identity, individual or collective, constituted, in part, by patriotic loyalty.

This portrayal does seem accurate as far as much patriotism as we know it is concerned. Yet Keller may be overstating his case as one against patriotism as such. This might not be a very satisfactory answer; we might agree with J. But however egocentric, irrational, asinine, surely it qualifies as patriotism.

In a later statement of his argument a, 80—81 , Keller seems to be of two minds on this point. Many think of patriotism as a natural and appropriate expression of attachment to the country in which we were born and raised and of gratitude for the benefits of life on its soil, among its people, and under its laws. They also consider patriotism an important component of our identity. Some go further, and argue that patriotism is morally mandatory, or even that it is the core of morality.

There is, however, a major tradition in moral philosophy which understands morality as essentially universal and impartial, and seems to rule out local, partial attachment and loyalty. A related objection is that patriotism is exclusive in invidious and dangerous ways. It tends to encourage militarism, and makes for international tension and conflict.

What, then, is the moral status of patriotism? The question does not admit of a single answer. We can distinguish five types of patriotism, and each needs to be judged on its merits. Machiavelli is famous or infamous for teaching princes that, human nature being what it is, if they propose to do their job well, they must be willing to break their promises, to deceive, dissemble, and use violence, sometimes in cruel ways and on a large scale, when political circumstances require such actions.

This may or may not be relevant to the question of patriotism, depending on just what we take the point of princely rule to be. This type of patriotism is extreme, but by no means extremely rare. Not much needs to be said about the moral standing of this type of patriotism, as it amounts to rejection of morality.

On the liberal view, where and from whom I learn the principles of morality is just as irrelevant to their contents and to my commitment to them, as where and from whom I learn the principles of mathematics is irrelevant to their contents and my adherence to them. For MacIntyre, where and from whom I learn my morality is of decisive importance both for my commitment to it and for its very contents. There is no morality as such; morality is always the morality of a particular community.

Moral rules are justified in terms of certain goods they express and promote; but these goods, too, are always given as part and parcel of the way of life of a community. The individual becomes a moral agent only when informed as such by his community. He also lives and flourishes as one because he is sustained in his moral life by his community. If I can live and flourish as a moral agent only as a member of my community, while playing the role this membership involves, then my very identity is bound up with that of my community, its history, traditions, institutions, and aspirations.

This leads MacIntyre to conclude that patriotism is not to be contrasted with morality; it is rather a central moral virtue, indeed the bedrock of morality. To that extent, this type of patriotism is critical and rational.

This account of patriotism is exposed to several objections. One might find fault with the step from communitarianism to patriotism:. If so, this type of patriotism would seem to involve the rejection of such basic moral notions as universal justice and common human solidarity. This is not a fair objection to patriotism as such. But the objection is pertinent, and has considerable force, when brought up against the type of patriotism advocated by MacIntyre.

If justice is understood in universal, rather than parochial terms, if common human solidarity counts as a weighty moral consideration, and if peace is of paramount importance and war is morally permissible only when it is just, then this kind of patriotism must be rejected.

There is considerable middle ground between these extremes. Exploring this middle ground has led some philosophers to construct positions accommodating both the universal and the particular point of view — both the mandates of universal justice and claims of common humanity, and the concern for the patria and compatriots. Baron argues that the conflict between impartiality and partiality is not quite as deep as it may seem. Morality allows for both types of considerations, as they pertain to different levels of moral deliberation.

At one level, we are often justified in taking into account our particular commitments and attachments, including those to our country. At another level, we can and ought to reflect on such commitments and attachments from a universal, impartial point of view, to delineate their proper scope and determine their weight. In such a case, partiality and particular concerns are judged to be legitimate and indeed valuable from an impartial, universal point of view.

This means that with respect to those matters and within the same limits, it is also good for a Cuban to judge as a Cuban and to put Cuban interests first, etc. Actually, this is how we think of our special obligations to, and preferences for, our family, friends, or local community; this kind of partiality is legitimate, and indeed valuable, not only for us but for anyone.

By doing so, she argues, our patriotism will leave room for serious, even radical criticism of our country, and will not be a force for dissension and conflict in the international arena. A good example is provided by the Ten Commandments, a major document of Western morality. The kind of patriotism defended by Nathanson and Baron is moderate in several distinct, but related respects. It acknowledges the constraints morality imposes on the pursuit of our individual and collective goals.

A true patriot speaks out when convinced his or her country is following an unwise or unjust course of action. Martin Luther King Jr. He envisioned a world whose people and nations had triumphed over poverty, racism, war and violence. Patriotism celebrates a country's strengths, but recognizes its failures and attempts to correct them. To assume that one's country is perfect, and therefore its system must be imposed on others, is not patriotism, but hubris.

Patriotism instills community, but if it insists on conformity, then patriotism becomes oppressive. Nationalism, which is patriotism carried to excess, has been responsible for destruction and slaughter throughout history.

One must be careful not to cross the line. Frankly, the world would be a better place if there were less patriotism within nations, and a greater acknowledgement of our common humanity among them.

Being unpatriotic is to undermine the nation's solidarity in time of war. Even after 3, Americans were murdered in a savage terrorist attack on U. This is unpatriotic, if not treason, because it demoralizes the troops, erodes support for the war and encourages the Islamic lunatics to continue their "jihad" terror with beheadings and slaughter of innocent civilians.

When I question the Bush administration's foreign policy it isn't that I hate America, but that I love it and believe what I was taught as a child that we're the good guys. I was taught that "bad guys" attack and bully other countries that do not threaten them.

We don't. The bad guys ignore international law and rape and torture. Not us. I believed this, and I care about this. If I didn't love and respect this country and the high ideals we claim, I wouldn't care. That in mind, we have to ask ourselves, where does our loyalty lie? Do we stand by and let our government decide for us who deserves the fundamentals of life?

Is it the American way to let a handful of politicians decide who deserves to live or die? It was my understanding that "We the People" meant the safety, justice, prosperity and freedoms of Americans is to be decided on by all her citizens.

That the issues affecting us all would be voted on by all because, and I quote, "We hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and pursuit of happiness.

We were greeted by the flag, thumb-tacked on the wall, and nearby was a large picture of George Washington. The school day began with the pledge of allegiance to the flag. Memorial Day was an event celebrated with a parade. We assembled in the street in front of the school. The President, yesterday, at a Patriot Day ceremony, tells me never to give into fear. He was a patriot of the noblest and most extensive views, and justly celebrated as a man of learning, eloquent and refined.

Pierre Van Cortlandt, a distinguished revolutionary patriot , died at his seat at Croton river, aged He was afterwards a member of the Massachusetts senate, and much esteemed as a physician and a patriot. Posing as a patriot King and boasting of his love for his adopted country, he ever remained at heart a Frenchman. And now, having attained all he could desire, Wilkes sank the patriot in the courtier. Save Word. Definition of patriotic. Examples of patriotic in a Sentence A patriotic fervor swept the country.

First Known Use of patriotic , in the meaning defined at sense 1. Learn More About patriotic. Time Traveler for patriotic The first known use of patriotic was in See more words from the same year.

Style: MLA. English Language Learners Definition of patriotic.